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The human impact of U.S. immigration law cannot be
overstated. Each person who faces deportation has a story. She
might be an undocumented mother who is a primary caregiver for a
young U.S. citizen daughter who suffers from a life-threatening
disease. He may be a teenager who aspires to work as a doctor and
who was brought to the United States as a baby without any
knowledge about his immigration status. He may be a middle-aged
man who has faced hardship in his birthplace and a jail sentence in
the US but whose dream is to provide for his family and teach his
own children about the value of hard work.
Deportation can hand these people cruel and unusual fates,
which can also damage the souls of those who are left behind.
Prosecutorial discretion is a powerful sword because it empowers
the government to decide this fate for thousands of people and their
families. 1 The visibility of prosecutorial discretion during President
Obama’s Administration might leave the impression that policies
like DACA and DAPA are something new or perhaps an
undiscovered tool in the toolbox, but history tells a different story.
As detailed in my book, Beyond Deportation: The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, prosecutorial
discretion, and deferred action in particular, has been used for
decades to protect thousands of individuals and families based on
* Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law at Penn State LawUniversity Park. This article is based on a talk delivered on November 9, 2015, at
the University of Cincinnati School of Law, http://www.law.uc.edu/journals/inlr.
Portions of this article are drawn from my book, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE
ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES published by NYU
Press in 2015; my article, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1285 (2015), and various blogs written about the case of
United States v. Texas. I would like to thank Ming Hsu Chen, and Amanda Frost
for their feedback on this Article. I also thank Lauren Holzer (’16), Meaghan
McGinnis (’17) and the Immigration and Nationality Law Review for their
research and editorial assistance.
1
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, 146-147. (New York
University Press 2015).
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primarily on humanitarian reasons.
In this article, I place the Supreme Court case of United
States v. Texas into a broader context by describing the history and
legal authority for prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and
highlighting the contents and recommendations in my book, Beyond
Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Cases. Part I of this article offers a primer on the role of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and also describes two
related programs announced by President Obama on November 20,
2014 and the subject of litigation for nearly two years as of this
writing. Part II provides a history and analysis of United States v.
Texas, a lawsuit originally brought by the state of Texas and twentyfive other states and decided on June 23, 2016. 2 This section offers
highlights from the oral arguments held at the U.S. Supreme Court
and my position on the sounder arguments. Part III raises normative
questions about the implementation, legitimacy, and continued
enforcement of immigration law against “priorities” identified by
the government. Part IV discusses my book Beyond Deportation,
which includes a history about discretion, my efforts to obtain data
about the individuals who receive discretion and recommendations
moving forward.
I.

Overview of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law

“Prosecutorial discretion” in immigration law refers to the
decision the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes about
whether to enforce the immigration law against a person or a group
of persons. 3 When prosecutorial discretion is exercised favorably
2

United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. _ (2016) (per curiam).
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo re: Policies]; John
Morton, Dir. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion

3
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towards a person, the government abstains from bringing a legally
valid immigration charge against a person or group of persons.
There are three theories behind the use of prosecutorial discretion in
the immigration context. The first theory is economic and
recognizes that the government only has the resources to deport less
than 400,000 people a year, or less than four percent of the
deportable population. 4 The second theory is humanitarian in nature
and recognizes that there are people residing in the United States
who have compelling equities like a high school diploma or a
serious medical condition who should be protected from removal. 5
A political third factor is the relationship between congressional
inaction and public demands for an administrative solution.6
Congress has failed to pass a comprehensive immigration reform
bill in more than twenty years, despite the fact that several bipartisan
bills have been debated during this time period. 7
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf [hereinafter Morton 7/11 Memo].
4
See The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. (2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/
2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [hereinafter DHS Authorization of
Priority Removal]; see also John Morton, Dir. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorialdiscretion/civil-imm-enforcement-priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf
[hereinafter Morton 3/11 Memo].
5
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 U. CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244-45 (2010).
6
Wadhia, supra note 1, at 8.
7
See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, How immigration reform failed, over and over, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
30,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/; RUTH ELLEN
WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPREHENSIVE
IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES TO
INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 2-5 (2013); ANDORRA
BRUNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44230, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
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Embracing all three theories of prosecutorial discretion was
the announcement by President Obama on November 20, 2014 to
use prosecutorial discretion to protect young people and families
from deportation. The two most controversial of these actions
pertain to two deferred action programs.
One program announced by the President was an expansion
to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, a
program established in 2012 that enables young people to apply for
deferred action if they are in school, came to the United States before
the age of sixteen, and meet other program requirements. 8 Those
granted DACA are eligible to apply for work authorization and, if
granted DACA, are protected from removal for a period of two

AND ISSUES IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 2-26 (2016); see generally Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Immigration: Mind over Matter, 5 U. MD, L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER &
CLASS 243 (2005).
8
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-daca (last updated Jan. 4, 2016). The specific requirements of the 2012
DACA program, are as follows:
1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012;
2. Came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday;
3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, up
to the present time;
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the
time of making your request for consideration of deferred action with
USCIS;
5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012;
6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of
completion from high school, have obtained a general education
development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran
of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and
7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three
or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to
national security or public safety. Id.
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years. 9 The changes announced on November 20, 2014 to DACA
(referred to in this article as “DACA Plus” or "expanded DACA")
would adjust the entry date from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010
and would also remove the age limit in the original 2012 program. 10
These changes would allow qualifying individuals to apply for
DACA regardless of their age if they show continuous residence
since January 1, 2010. Cris is one individual who could qualify for
DACA Plus if it were not held up in litigation:
Cris: Cris was born in the Philippines and arrived in
the United States at the age of 6, but missed the
original cut-off for DACA by one year. Cris is the
founder of an award-winning start-up company,
GrantAnswers, which helps low-income and first
generation students secure academic and career
opportunities. Cris founded this company after
helping students earn more than one million dollars
in grants and scholarships for college. He is also
developing a career readiness mobile application
called KeyJargon. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in
Psychology and a Master’s degree in Criminal
Justice from the City University of New York, and
has nearly completed his PhD. Despite his
professional successes, Cris remains undocumented.
The implementation of expanded DACA would
alleviate his and his family’s concerns that he may be
deported. Through expanded DACA, Cris would be
9

Janet Napolitano, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
(June
15,
2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
10
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents
of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_a
ction.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion].
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able to continue his doctoral studies, the funding for
which was revoked due to his immigration status,
and pursue additional career opportunities in public
service helping youth and marginalized groups. 11
The second program establishes a new Deferred Action for
Parents of American and Legal Residents program (DAPA). DAPA
would enable undocumented parents to request deferred action and
work authorization if they can show 1) continuous residence since
January 1, 2010; 2) a relationship as the parent to a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident child born on or before November 20,
2014; 3) unlawful status on November 20, 2014 and on the date of
application; 4) they are not an enforcement priority for removal; and
5) they warrant protection as a matter of discretion. 12 It is estimated
that sixty-nine percent of persons eligible for DAPA have resided in
the United States for ten years or more. 13 The human impact of
11

Brief for American Immigration Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, United States v. State of Texas, No. 15-674 (Mar. 8, 2016), 2016 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1154. Significantly, the 2012 DACA program has
transformed the lives of more than half a million people as data from DHS
confirms that more than 700,000 initial requests for DACA have been approved.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process (Through Fiscal Year 2016, 2nd
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGR.
SERVICES,
Qtr),
U.S.
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20
Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_
performancedata_fy2016_qtr2.pdf (last visited June 11, 2016). To illustrate the
impact and diversity of those who have benefited from DACA 2012, consider the
story of Ji In (Kit) Lee a college student in Los Angeles, California who came to
the United States with her mother from Korea when she was 5-years-old. See
Community Stories: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), WHITE
HOUSE INITIATIVE ON ASIAN AM. & PAC. ISLANDERS, http://sites.ed.gov
/aapi/community-stories/#DeferredActionforChildhoodArrivals (last visited June
11, 2016). Says Kit,“DACA has opened up so many opportunities for me—school,
scholarships, and work. But it’s also brought my family a sense of certainty, which
has had real effects on our daily lives. The fact that my mom doesn’t have to worry
about me being deported. We breathe a little easier today because of DACA.” Id.
12
Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10.
13
Randy Capps et al., Deferred Action for Unauthorized Immigrant Parents:
Analysis of DAPA’s Potential Effects on Families and Children, MIGRATION
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DAPA is compelling, as it would protect individuals with significant
roots in the United States from deportation and make them eligible
to apply for employment authorization. Alina is one example of a
person who would qualify for DAPA if the program were
operational:
Dr. Alina Kipchumba:. Dr. Alina Kipchumba, a
citizen of Kenya, came to the United States in 1995
to begin a Ph.D. program. In 2002, she obtained a
Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from the University of
Illinois in Chicago. For six years she had work
authorization, and she was employed at the
University of South Florida and then at the Sarasota
Christian School. Dr. Kipchumba’s 11-year-old son,
a U.S. citizen, was born with a serious heart
condition and has undergone multiple open-heart
surgeries. Her son’s pediatric cardiologist warned
her that it would be impossible for her son to receive
the medical treatment he requires in Kenya and that
returning to Kenya would be “a death sentence” for
him. DAPA would enable Dr. Kipchumba to once
again have work authorization, resume working as a
teacher, and support her U.S. citizen child. 14
Also on November 20, 2014, President Obama published a
new priorities memorandum setting forth refined priorities for
immigration enforcement. The new priorities for enforcement are in
descending order: 1) threats to national security, border security and
public safety, including many felony convictions and those
convicted of an aggravated felony; 2) misdemeanants and new
immigration violators, including recent entrants and those convicted
POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferredaction-unauthorized-immigrant-parents-analysis-dapas-potential-effectsfamilies.
14
Brief for American Immigration Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 11.
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of a “significant misdemeanor”; and 3) “other” immigration
violations including people who received a final order of removal
on or after January 1, 2014. 15 Any person who fits within these
priorities is disqualified from DAPA. 16 The breadth of the priorities
memorandum illustrates that adults and children without a criminal
history can fall within a priority category. This memo also provides
a revised policy on prosecutorial discretion for DHS and lists more
than one dozen types of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law
such as the issuance and cancellation of a Notice to Appear (the
DHS charging document against a noncitizen alleged to be in
violation of the immigration laws); a choice by DHS to refrain from
arrest or interrogation of an individual; a choice by DHS not to file
an appeal where an Immigration Judge has granted relief to the
noncitizen and choices to grant deferred action, parole or a stay of
removal, among others. 17 Finally, the memo grapples with the more
complicated cases that may involve a person who appears to be a
priority but whose equities may instead warrant a favorable exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. 18 For example, a person who recently
entered the United States unlawfully and therefore is potentially
eligible for “Priority 2” may also be a mother to children born in the
United States for whom she is the primary caregiver and
breadwinner. Arguably, this person should not be treated as an
enforcement priority in light of the equities present in her case.

II.

United States v. Texas: The Litigation
a. Procedural History

15

Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3.
Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10.
17
Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3.
18
Id.
16
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United States v. Texas originates from a lawsuit brought by
the state of Texas and twenty-five other states challenging the
legality of DAPA and DACA Plus. 19 On February 16, 2015, Judge
Andrew S. Hanen of the Federal District Court in Brownsville, TX
halted the new deferred action programs through a tool called
preliminary injunction, after concluding that the plaintiffs had
standing and should have placed the deferred action programs
through “notice and comment rulemaking” under the Administrative
Procedure
Act. 20
The
123-page
opinion
contained
misrepresentations about immigration law and policy, some of
which were memorialized in another letter signed by 104 law
professors. 21 As one example, the letter criticizes Judge Hanen’s
characterization of deferred action as lacking statutory authority and
beyond the scope of prosecutorial discretion. 22 Contrary to this
characterization and as described below, the Administration has
ample authority to operate a deferred action program.
The Administration (represented by attorneys in the
Department of Justice) appealed Judge Hanen’s decision to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral arguments were heard on July 10,
2015 and heard by a three-judge panel. 23 The hearing displayed
19

Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
21
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, supra note 19, at 604; Letter from
Law Professors in Response to Preliminary Injunction on Executive Actions (Mar.
13, 2015),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Law Professors].
22
Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21. For a comprehensive account of the
misstatements made by the district court, see Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action,
Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive
Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58 (2015).
23
Oral Argument, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No.1540238), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-information/oral-argumentrecordings (search July 10, 2015 for State of Texas, et al. v. USA, et al.); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration argument at the fifth circuit, THE HILL (July 14,
2015, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/247862immigration-argument-at-the-fifth-circuit.
20
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great confusion around the terms lawful presence, deferred action,
and employment authorization to name a few. As I expressed in
earlier commentary:
Mildly frustrating were the flaws made by the state
of Texas like calling DAPA a change in law and
pointing to the administration for failing to abide by
the congressional statute. Absent from this argument
was the statutory authority for prosecutorial
discretion decisions by DHS like section 103(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act and the
additional legal authorities and history for deferred
action in immigration law. Likewise, Texas argued
that there is “no” statute or rule that allows the
government to grant lawful presence and yet there is
a clear definition for (un)lawful presence in
immigration law and reams of guidance documents
about how this statute should be applied. …One
revealing aspect of the hearing was that no one party
was in agreement about how the term “deferred
action” would be defined -- perhaps this was
intentional. During the argument, the scope and
definition of deferred action was identified in at least
four different ways: 1) deferred action was
interchanged with all forms of prosecutorial
discretion; 2) deferred action was interchanged with
“lawful presence;” 3) deferred action was defined as
foregoing removal proceedings; 4) deferred action
was identified as one basis for work authorization
under the regulations. The use of multiple and
sometimes misleading definitions of deferred action
at the hearing made it nearly impossible to have a
meaningful discussion. 24
24

Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration argument at the fifth circuit, THE HILL
(July 14, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/247862immigration-argument-at-the-fifth-circuit.
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Following this argument, a divided three-judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 135-page decision on
November 9, 2015 in favor of the states. 25 Policy and media
commentators predicted the states would prevail in this lawsuit in
part because of the composition of the panel. As described by the
media outlet Politico “[T]he selection of [Judge] Smith — who
wrote the opinion denying the administration’s request for an
emergency stay — and [Judge] Elrod suggests Obama likely won’t
have much luck winning the case at the Fifth Circuit, considered the
most conservative appeals court in the nation.” 26 Of note, Judge
Carolyn King of the Fifth Circuit issued a sharp dissent that ran as
long as the majority opinion. 27
On November 20, 2015, the Administration petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 28 On January 19, 2016, the high court agreed to hear
from parties on the following four questions:
(1) Whether a state that voluntarily provides a
subsidy to all aliens with deferred action has Article
III standing and a justiciable cause of action under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
challenge the guidance seeking to establish a process
25

See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015),
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C15/15-40238-CV0.pdf; see
also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Seeking to Understand the Fifth Circuit Ruling
on Deferred Action, ACSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/
acsblog/seeking-to-understand-the-fifth-circuit-ruling-on-deferred-action.
26
Seung Min Kim, Obama’s Immigration Actions Face Skeptical Judges,
POLITICO (June 29, 2015, 11:49 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/obama-executive-action-immigrationfifth-circuit-court-judges-119544#ixzz43x7gysXF.
27
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting).
28
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. __ (2016) (No.
15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/us-v-texaspetition.pdf.
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for considering deferred action for certain aliens
because it will lead to more aliens having deferred
action; (2) whether the guidance is arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(3) whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s
notice-and-comment procedures; and (4) whether the
guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution, Article II, section 3.” 29
Oral arguments were heard on April 18, 2016. 30 The Supreme Court
rendered a ruling on June 23, 2016. 31 The ruling was essentially a
non-decision as the justices split 4-4 offering nothing more than a
nine word decision “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court.” 32 The immediate implications of a 4-4 tie are that
the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to block the
DACA Plus and DAPA programs remain. As no reasoning or
analysis was provided by the justices about the Supreme Court's 44 split, the following analyzes the lower court decisions and oral
arguments against these four questions and provides my take on
which is the sounder argument. 33
b. Standing

29

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016)
(No. 15-674),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/15674_h3dj.pdf.
31
United States v. Texas, 579 U.S., supra note 2.
32
See id.; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: A meditation on
history, law, and loss, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 23, 2016, 2:08 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-meditation-on-history-lawand-loss/.
33
Beyond the scope of this article is an analysis of the procedural landscape of
the litigation moving forward. For a short piece on the possibilities, see:
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive-actions/unitedstates-v-state-of-texas/supreme-courts-tie-vote-means-dapa-daca/
30
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A threshold question in the case is whether Texas and the
other twenty-five states have the right to bring a lawsuit in the first
place. In order to have standing, the states would have to show they
would suffer a direct and concrete injury. 34 Standing originates from
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which allows for
judicial power in “cases” and “controversies” involving the United
States or States. 35 In describing the standing doctrine Lyle
Dinnerstein of the SCOTUS Blog reports:
a state government — like anyone else who seeks to
sue in those courts — would have to show that the
action being challenged causes it a definite injury or
harm. The injury cannot be theoretical or
speculative; it must be real, existing right now or
predictably. That is to assure that there is an actual
“case or controversy,” as the Constitution
demands. 36
The Administration argued that Texas is unable to show a concrete
injury to themselves. Texas argued that it would suffer an injury by
having to spend millions of dollars for noncitizens who are “lawfully
present” and therefore eligible for a driver’s license under Texas’s
law. 37 To prove this, Texas argued that the average price for
34
Amanda Frost, Academic highlight: State standing and United States v. Texas,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 14, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/04/academic-highlight-state-standing-and-united-states-v-texas/; Stephen
Legomsky, Supreme Court Immigration Case Will Have Profound Impact,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephen-legomsky/supreme-court-immigration_b_9044870.html.
35
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36
Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: A big, or not so big, ruling due on
immigration, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2016, 9:07 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/04/argument-preview-a-big-or-not-so-bigruling-due-on-immigration/.
37
Brief for Petitioner at 18-36, United States v. Texas et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016)
(No. 15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/15674tsUnitedStates.pdf.

107

36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015).

processing a driver’s license is greater than the application fee.
Importantly, any federal law or policy that benefits the foreign
national is going to implicate states in some way. 38
Throughout the litigation, Texas also argued that as a
sovereign state it should be given ‘special solicitude’ in the standing
analysis, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA 39 as support. In that case, the Court held that Massachusetts
had standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s
failure to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act. 40 Texas argued that “[t]o deny standing here, the
Court would need to overrule Massachusetts and reject special
solicitude for States in the standing analysis.” 41 The United States
argued that Texas should not be given “special solicitude” because
unlike Massachusetts’ injury (erosion of coastal property), the harm
alleged by Texas is avoidable. Texas could charge more for its
driver’s licenses so that it doesn’t lose money when providing them
to deferred action recipients, or alternatively it could choose not to
provide licenses to deferred action recipients. As the United States
explained in its reply brief to the Supreme Court, "[w]hen a state
makes a voluntary choice to tie a state-law subsidy to another
38

Professor Stephen Legomsky has argued that Texas lacks standing and in
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee noted: “If that is so, and if the
mere fact that favorable immigration decisions by the federal immigration agency
could have a net negative fiscal impact for a particular state were enough to confer
standing, then the state in which a given noncitizen lives would have standing to
challenge every individual grant of deferred action that is considered erroneous
…The court’s logic would permit the state to challenge every grant of every
immigration benefit that leads to eligibility for a driver’s license or any other state
benefit. The Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (2015) (testimony
of Stephen Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law),
https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/legomsky_testimony. pdf.
39
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
40
Id. at 526.
41
Brief for Respondents at 34, United States v. Texas et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016)
(No.
15-674),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
supreme_court_preview/briefs_2015_2016/15-674_resp.authcheckdam.pdf.
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sovereign’s actions, the State does not thereby obtain standing
to sue the other sovereign whenever the latter’s actions
incidentally increase the cost of that subsidy." 42
c. Legality and Lawful Presence
Throughout this litigation, the courts and plaintiff-states
spent an inordinate amount of time discussing the President’s legal
authority to use his discretion to operate a deferred action program.
However, this legal authority is abundantly clear. The legal
foundation for prosecutorial discretion can be found in the United
States Constitution,43 the immigration statute created by Congress
(INA), 44 binding precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 and
regulations and policy documents from the DHS. 46 In Arizona v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that: “A principal
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials. …Federal officials, as an initial matter, must
decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.” 47 Congress
has delegated the responsibility of administering and enforcing the
immigration laws to the DHS. This delegation is explicit in section
103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or The Act). 48
42

It is an open question whether states may deny only some immigrants with
deferred action from obtaining receive driver’s licenses. See e.g., ADAC v.
Brewer, 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016). Importantly, this section is selective and
does not cover every argument concerning standing in the Texas case. The author
thanks scholar Amanda Frost for sharing this point and her insights for this
paragraph. See Amanda Frost, supra note 34. For a nice analysis about the
standing issues in Texas, see Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United
States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016).
43
U.S. CONST., supra note 35.
44
See e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
45
See e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–84
(1999).
46
See e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (providing that deferred action
recipients may apply for work authorization if they can show an “economic
necessity for employment”).
47
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
48
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
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Similarly, section 242 of the Act prohibits judicial review for three
specific prosecutorial discretion decisions (commencement of
proceedings, adjudication of cases, and execution of removal
orders), only reaffirming the delegation of prosecutorial discretion
powers to DHS. 49 Animating the statute are regulations,
memoranda, and a long history of the agency using deferred action
as a tool for placing low priority cases on the backburner. The
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 274.12(c)(14) was published more than
twenty years ago and explicitly identifies “deferred action” as one
basis for work authorization. 50 The legality of these programs have
also been upheld by the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel, DHS leadership, and more than 130 immigration law
professors. 51
49

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
Seizure and Forfeiture of Conveyances, 8 C.F.R. § 274.12(c)(14) (2016).
Beyond the scope of this article, but interesting to point out, is whether Texas et
al. are really more concerned about the work authorization as opposed to the
legality of deferred action. At one point during the oral arguments, Justice Elena
Kagan asked the Texas Solicitor General, “it seems to me your real gripe here -and you -- maybe it’s a real gripe -- your real grip here is to the work authorization
piece the benefits pieces; is that right?” see Transcript of Oral Argument at 53,
United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15-674),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/15674_h3dj.pdf. She continued to probe whether the Texas Solicitor General should
be attacking this regulation as opposed to the legality of deferred action itself. Id.
at 53-55. For more commentary on the relationship between work authorization
and prosecutorial discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Employment
Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Case for Immigration
Unexceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/employment-authorization-and-prosecutorialdiscretion-the-case-for-immigration-unexceptionalism-by-s. See also Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2016); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, U.S. v. Texas—True or False?, IMMIGR. PROF BLOG (Apr.
19, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/04/us-v-texastrue-or-false-by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia.html.
51
See Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3; Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 10; DHS Authorization of Priority Removal, supra note 4.
For a contrary view on the legality of these programs, raised only by a handful of
scholars in contrast to the 135 plus who have supported their legality, see Jan C.
50
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Despite this legal authority, the exchanges between the
lawyers and the Justices on whether the deferred action programs
are lawful persisted. In one portion of the argument, Justice Anthony
Kennedy said, “the briefs go on for pages to the effect that the
President has admitted a certain number of people and then
Congress approves it. That seems to me to have it backwards. It’s as
if—that the President is setting the policy and the Congress is
executing it. That’s just upside down.” As I concluded in my earlier
analysis of his argument:
Justice Kennedy’s discomfort with the notion that the
Executive Branch is dictating policy to the
Legislative Branch is simply not the case here. In fact
the Executive Branch’s discretionary authority to
temporarily protect low priority people from
deportation was at the direction of Congress which
explicitly delegated the administration and
enforcement of immigration laws to the Department
of Homeland Security and has required, by statute,
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish
immigration enforcement policies and priorities. 52
Another set of confusing exchanges during the litigation and
continuing through the oral arguments centered on “lawful
Ting, U.S. Immigration Policy and President Obama’s Executive Order for
Deferred Action, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 65 (2016) and Peter Margulies, DAPA
and a Pragmatic View of Work Authorization and Family Fairness: Reply to
PROF
BLOG
(Apr.
21,
2016),
Marty
Lederman,
IMMIGR.
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/ 2016/04/dapa-and-a-pragmaticview-of-work-authorization-and-family-fairness-reply-to-marty-lederman.html.
52
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Understanding Justice Kennedy’s “Upside Down”
Argument in U.S. v. Texas, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/04/20/justice-kennedy-united-states-vtexas/. For a comprehensive analysis about the OLC opinion see Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE
L.J. 104 (2015).
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presence” which Texas et al. marketed as a “transformation” of an
unlawful status to a lawful one. This might leave the mistaken
impression that lawful presence and deferred action are
interchangeable or perhaps even more importantly that lawful
presence and legal status are the same thing. As highlighted by more
than 100 law professors and a chamber of legal scholars
commenting after the oral arguments, persons deemed lawfully
present remain without a legal status. 53 Professor Anil Kalhan
highlights the misconstruction around “lawful presence” and notes:
“Properly understood, therefore, “lawful presence” should be
regarded as a red herring in this litigation. To the extent that specific
statutory provisions under federal, state, or local law make terms
like “lawful presence” or “unlawful presence” relevant to particular
legal consequences that might result for individuals who have been
given notice of deferred action, those provisions operate collaterally
and must be analyzed specifically and separately.” 54
While immigration scholars understand too well the rich
distinctions between “lawful presence” and “lawful status,” the two
terms remain an enigma for lawyers outside of this field. During oral
arguments, Solicitor General Donald Verrelli reacted to a question
about “lawful presence” in the following way:
… [T]hat phrase, ‘lawful presence,’ has caused a
terrible amount of confusion in this case; I realize it.
But the reality is it means something different to
people in the immigration world. What it means in
the immigration world is not that you have a legal
right to be in the United States, that your status has
53

See e.g., Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21; Anil Kalhan, Deferred
Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for
Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58 (2015); Anil
Kalhan, DAPA, “Lawful Presence,” and the Illusion of a Problem, YALE J. ON
REG. ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/dapa-lawfulpresence-and-the-illusion-of-a-problem-by-anil-kalhan.
54
Kalhan, DAPA, supra note 53.
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changed in any way, that you have any defense to
removal. It doesn’t mean any of those things, and it
never has. And so at that fundamental level, we are
not trying to change anybody’s legal status. 55
The idea that legal terms of art can differ from the ordinary
meaning of a phrase is neither novel nor specific to immigration law.
New York Times columnist Linda Greenhouse stated with wit that
“[i]t turns out that the phrase “lawful presence,” understood as a
term embedded in the labyrinth of statutes, regulations and practice
of immigration law, doesn’t have the obvious meaning it would have
in everyday speech, namely that someone is in the country legally
and has the right to remain here. Is that really so hard for two of the
top lawyers in the United States to understand?” 56
d. Notice and Comment Rulemaking
The third question raised by the high court (but receiving
little attention during oral arguments) revolves around “notice and
comment” rulemaking. The plaintiff-states argued that rulemaking
is required under the APA. For certain rules, section 553 of the APA
requires agencies to engage in “informal rulemaking,” where the
government publishes a notice of the proposed rule and the parties
then provide input primarily through the submission of written
55
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __
(2016)
(No.
15-674),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/15-674_h3dj.pdf.
56
Linda Greenhouse, When Smart Supreme Court Justices Play Dumb, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/opinion/whensmart-supreme-court-justices-play-dumb.html?_r=0. For a history on how
noncitizens with “lawful presence” have qualified for certain rights and benefits
despite their unauthorized status and the erosion of these rights following the 1996
immigration laws, see Sara N. Kominers, Caught in the Gap Between Status and
No-Status: Lawful Presence Then and Now, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 57
(2016) (“The concept of conferring rights and benefits to lawfully present but outof-status noncitizens gained significant momentum in the 1970’s through the
judicially created category of noncitizens who were ‘permanently residing under
color of law’ (PRUCOL)”).
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comment within a specified time period. 57 Recognizing the value of
agency control over internal procedure and the importance of
efficiency, section 553 exempts "general statements of policy" from
the notice and comment rulemaking requirement. 58 The Supreme
Court has held that "general statements of policy" include agencies'
announcements as to how they plan to exercise discretionary powers
going forward. 59
In the memorandum announcing DAPA, the Secretary of
Homeland Security explicitly instructed the USCIS officers to
assess the facts of each individual case and to exercise discretion
even in cases where all the threshold criteria – some of which are
themselves discretionary – have been met. 60 Texas et al. argued that
this is a pretext – i.e. in practice, USCIS officials will be pressured
into approving DAPA requests mechanically. 61 To prove this, Texas
relied on the low rate of denials among recipients of the earlier
program, DACA 2012. 62 This rationale is flawed. First, the DAPA
program has discretion built into it as confirmed by the program’s
actual requirement that the individual “present no other factors that,
in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action
inappropriate.” 63 Second, DACA requestors are a highly selfselected group. 64 Moreover, the DAPA program has not even
begun, so there is no evidence to show that employees are not using
discretion, assuming of course the test even rests on the discretion
exercised by boots on the ground as opposed to the Secretary of
DHS, a point reasonably questioned by scholar Michael Kagan. 65
57

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
Id.
59
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979).
60
Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10.
61
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 64.
62
Id. at 63.
63
Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10.
64
The pool of DACA applicants is self-selected because the government has
published guiding criteria that must be fulfilled in order to be eligible to apply.
65
Michael Kagen, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle
Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665 (2016).
58
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There is no basis for assuming that the DAPA approval rates will
mimic those for DACA. Under the states’ logic, I could determine
whether my 5-year old is completing his homework based solely on
my 8-year old’s completion rate. Importantly, every guidance
document published by the immigration agency (INS and DHS) on
prosecutorial discretion ranging from the 1976 memo by Sam
Bernsen, 66 1975 Operations Instruction, 67 2000 Meissner Memo 68
and 2011 Morton memos 69 have been in the form of policy
documents and excepted from the notice and comment rulemaking
requirement. As explained in a letter by 104 law professors in
response to the district court opinion issued by Judge Andrew Hanen
in this case, “[t]he mere existence of guiding criteria has not meant
and does not with DAPA and DACA, mean that applications are
merely rubberstamped.” 70 In this way, the states have gravely
mistaken an act of transparency for a violation of the law. 71
e. Take Care Clause
Importantly, the Supreme Court requested briefing on the
fourth question namely whether the deferred action programs violate
the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Almost absent from
the oral arguments on April 18 was a discussion of this question. In
my view, the Take Care Clause only supports the use of
prosecutorial discretion. In its brief, Texas argued that DAPA
66

Sam Bersen, Gen. Counsel, Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion (Jul. 15, 1976),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf.
67
Id.; (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions,
O.I. § 103.1(a)(I)(ii) (1975).
68
Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Exercising
Prosecutorial
Discretion
(Nov.
17,
2000),
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000memo.pdf [hereinafter Meissner Memo].
69
Morton 3/11 Memo, supra note 4; Morton 7/11 Memo, supra note 3.
70
Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21.
71
The foregoing analysis originally appeared here: Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Seeking to Understand the Fifth Circuit Ruling on Deferred Action, ACSBLOG
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia.
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violates the Take Care Clause. Texas reasoned that DAPA declares
conduct that Congress established as unlawful to be lawful. 72 The
Administration argued that a “Take Care question also is not
justiciable, and respondents have no cause of action to raise such a
claim. And in any event, the Secretary is faithfully executing the
weighty and complex task of administering and enforcing the
INA.” 73 DHS has an obligation to both enforce the immigration laws
against high priorities and exercise prosecutorial discretion
favorably towards others-- this lies at the core of the Take Care
Clause. 74 This point was highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Heckler v. Chaney when it held that “[t]he decision of a prosecutor
in the Executive Branch not to indict . . . has long been regarded as
the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘[T]ake Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.’” 75 Possibly, if the President halted
immigration enforcement altogether it would be in violation of the
Take Care Clause, but that is not what we have seen during the
President’s tenure. Instead, there have been a record number of
deportations; two million during the first five years of his tenure
alone. 76 No one can really say the President has failed to enforce the
immigration laws.
III.

Beyond the Litigation
a. Implementation and Legitimacy
Had the U.S. Supreme Court reached a decision, DHS would

72

Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 17.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 17.
74
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, Deferred
Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 59 (2013); see generally Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
75
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
76
See e.g., Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. deportations of
immigrants reach record high in 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-ofimmigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.
73
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have had a limited window to operationalize the deferred action
programs and furthermore would have been required to achieve the
right level of public acceptability and legitimacy. In a piece by
scholar Ming H. Chen on the role of legitimacy and executive action
and in the context of the Texas litigation, she notes:
[I]f public confidence in the expanded DACA and
DAPA programs begins to unravel, it will not likely
be the result of a judicial pronouncement of
illegality. It will instead be the result of the
legitimacy concerns unveiled by the argument about
the executive branch as a legitimate, fair, and
trustworthy source of institutional authority.” 77
Moving forward and correctly, Chen urges us to focus on
“legitimacy” as opposed to just the “legality” of executive action,
which from a functional standpoint may matter most in determining
how states react and recognize the program. Joseph Landau explains
how the Executive can enhance this legitimacy through
“bureaucratic buy-in.” 78 He describes how connecting the
discretionary decisionmaking between front line officers in cases
may legitimize the DACA Plus and DAPA programs in meaningful
ways. 79
b. Family Separation and Enforcement Priorities
Beyond the litigation is the still operational Administration’s
77

See Ming Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 142 (2016).
78
Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and
Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1225 (2016) (“In short, bureaucratic buyin could supply DACA and DAPA with an added - and needed - measure of
legitimacy. Indeed, presidential administrations should not refrain from touting
the extent to which across-the-board enforcement policies are consistent not only
with decades of agency guidelines, but also enforcement decisions rendered on
the ground.”).
79
Id. at 1173-1240.
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priorities memo or third policy described above. 80 In the wake of the
non-decision in United States v. Texas, the current Administration
has a limited window during which to implement existing
prosecutorial discretion tools, including but not limited to the policy
outlined in the Johnson Memo. 81 Every Dreamer 82 and parent who
would have qualified for DACA Plus or DAPA is not an
enforcement priority and therefore should not be targeted for
enforcement by DHS. Such individuals may also qualify for another
type of prosecutorial discretion like a stay of removal, parole or
deferred action. 83 For example, a parent and primary caregiver to
three U.S. citizen children could request deferred action with
USCIS. 84 Importantly, individuals who qualify for DACA 2012 may
still request deferred action using the pre-existing form and
procedures outlined by DHS. 85 Finally, individuals who present
other sympathetic factors should be informed about the
humanitarian factors outlined in existing policy 86 and weigh the
risks and possibilities of making an affirmative request.
Data obtained from USCIS in 2016 provides a snapshot of
186 deferred action cases and confirms the agency’s continued

80

Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3.
See Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10.
82
Individuals who would have qualified for DACA Plus.
83
See e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: Prosecutorial
Discretion Requests after U.S. v. Texas, ACSBLOG (June 28, 2016),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/beyond-deportation-prosecutorial-discretionrequests-after-us-v-texas.
84
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Standard Operating Procedure for Deferred Action
(non-DACA) (2015), available at
https://works.bepress.com/shoba_wadhia/36/
85
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note
8.
86
See Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10; Meissner
Memo, supra note 68; Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17,
2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domesticviolence.pdf; see also Wadhia, supra note 83.
81
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practice of deferred action. 87 Of the 185 deferred action requests
provided in this data collection that were made between 2012-2015,
sixty-five were granted, forty-three were denied and seventy-seven
were labeled as “no action.” Notably, the reasons for a deferred
action grant were largely humanitarian and included both serious
medical issues as well as family support requests. Deferred action
may be a viable option for those affected by the Texas litigation and
others who present sympathetic factors. 88
Co-existing with the Administration’s use of prosecutorial
discretion to protect individuals and families from deportation for
humanitarian reasons is the discretion used to enforce the
immigration laws against those labeled as “enforcement priorities.”
Throughout, and beyond this litigation, DHS has continued to apply
the Priorities Memo to individuals who appear to fall within the new
priorities. This Priorities Memo has also sparked, or at least
facilitated, a series of enforcement actions or immigration raids and
deportations against Central American parents and children who fit
within the Priorities Memo. 89 This created a firestorm of press and
fear in communities and shattered the President’s own commitment
to keeping families together through prosecutorial discretion. 90 As
described in a highly critical editorial by the New York Times:
87

Letter from Jill A. Eggleston, Director FOIA Operations, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, to author (Jan. 19, 2016) (unpublished FOIA response
enclosed) (on file with author); For a comprehensive analysis of the data set see,
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Aftermath of United States v. Texas:
Rediscovering Deferred Action, Yale Journal on Regulation, Notice and
Comment (Aug. 10, 2016) http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-aftermath-of-united-statesv-texas-rediscovering-deferred-action-by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia/
88
Wadhia, supra note 83.
89
Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3.
90
See e.g., Gustavo Valdes, U.S. raids target Central American immigrants, CNN
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/05/us/immigration-raids-centralamericans/; Lisa Rein, U.S. authorities begin raids, taking 121 illegal immigrants
into custody over the weekend, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2016/01/04/u-sauthorities-begin-raids-taking-121-illegal-immigrants-into-custody-over-theweekend/.
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…ICE has been running amok, raiding homes and
public spaces in search of deportable youths. In
North Carolina and Georgia, where organized
advocacy is sparse, the dragnet has been unusually
aggressive. Agents seized students at home and on
their way to school. Appalled teachers, students and
community leaders have been signing petitions and
marching, pleading for justice and putting a human
face on the victims of coldblooded policies: Wildin
Acosta, still in detention, as his appeal proceeds.
Kimberly Pineda-Chavez, arrested on her way to
school. Yefri Sorto-Hernandez, arrested at his school
bus stop. 91
Possibly, these raids enabled the Administration to showcase to the
high Court and the public that it does enforce the immigration laws,
and far from acting arbitrarily, targets its limited resources towards
the listed priorities. 92 But for immigration advocates on the ground,
these raids highlight a policy that runs afoul of the Administration’s
express commitment to use prosecutorial discretion wisely and keep
families together. 93
IV.

Beyond Deportation: The Broader Context

91
Editorial Board, The Dark Side of Immigration Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
20,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/opinion/the-dark-side-ofimmigration-discretion.html.
92
See e.g., Dara Lind, The nationwide immigration raids targeting Central
American Families, explained, VOX (Jan. 4, 2016, 1:28PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/12/28/10673452/deportation-central-americanimmigrant-families; Families in Fear: The Atlanta Immigration Raids, S.
POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/20160128/families-fear-atlantaimmigration-raids (last visited June 11, 2016).
93
See The Dark Side of Immigration Discretion, supra note 91; see also Ghita
Schwarz, Obama’s Two-Faced Immigration Policy, CTR. CON. RTS.,
https://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2016/04/21/obama-s-two-faced-immigrationpolicy (last visited June 11, 2016).
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My preoccupation with prosecutorial discretion began as a
law student in summer 1998, I began working for a boutique
immigration law firm in Washington D.C. During my years there I
met noncitizens from all over the globe seeking refuge from
persecution abroad; opportunities to continue research at an
internationally renowned institution; and relief from deportation
(removal) to remain with their families in the United States; among
others. The most compelling cases I handled as a lawyer involved
prosecutorial discretion. I later spent six years with an advocacy
organization committed to comprehensive immigration reform but
also challenged by the sharp reaction to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, which resulted in many immigration policies
with far reaching consequences for Arab, Muslim and South Asian
communities and with minimal attention to or understanding for the
role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases. When I joined
Penn State Law in 2008, the study of prosecutorial discretion
emerged as a natural calling for my research and culminated into
several law reviews and my first book: Beyond Deportation: The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases.
Beyond Deportation is organized into eight chapters –one
discusses the immigration case of John Lennon and the efforts
undertaken by his attorney, Leon Wildes, to encourage the immigration agency to publish its policies about prosecutorial discretion.
The Lennon case is significant because it triggered the publication
of the immigration agency’s first guidance on “deferred action,”
showcased most recently with the President’s executive actions.
The book provides a detailed history of “deferred action” and how
it has been applied to individuals and special populations like victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other crimes. The
book scrutinizes thousands of deferred action cases and identifies a
pattern for the types of cases that are processed and granted deferred
action. In the last fifty years, people have received deferred action
for largely humanitarian reasons including: Long term presence in
the United States; Serious medical condition or a primary caregiver
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to a person with a serious medical condition; U.S. citizen family
members; and/or Advanced or tender age. 94
Much of the deferred action data analyzed in my book was
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In the
early years of my FOIA adventures, the data was in some cases
disorganized, illegible, and elusive. Even obtaining illegible data
was remarkably exhausting and sometimes involved multiple
communications with FOIA officers, government attorneys, and the
DHS’s own ombudsman. But the challenge was not limited to the
shield held by the agency over the information itself or questions to
myself about whether practitioners and scholars should have to file
a FOIA to obtain basic information on topics like how to file a
deferred action request. 95 The challenges were more complex
because some of the data I sought was simply not tracked by the
agency. As one example and as a result of a FOIA lawsuit with ICE
over deferred action cases, ICE confirmed that it did not track
deferred action cases before 2012. 96
My own experiences in seeking and sorting data inform the
book’s discussion about transparency. Transparency in
prosecutorial discretion matters because it improves the possibility
that justice will be served for people whose roots and presence are
in the United States. Transparency also promotes other
administrative law values like consistency, efficiency, and public
acceptability. I commend DHS for advancing these values through
DACA—by creating a program that is transparent and aimed at
protecting young people. Beyond Deportation closes with praise for
DACA but is replete with recommendations to the general deferred
action program, which continues to lack a form, lacks specific
criteria, or even instructions on how to apply. DHS should
formalize the deferred action program and centralize the processing
94
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of all cases at USCIS to promote consistency, uniformity, and
efficiency. These values serve as the premise for why I recommend
notice and comment rulemaking or, in the alternative, a broad
deferred action program assembled with more formality like the
DACA program. 97
Importantly, my recommendation for codifying deferred
action as a regulation pre-date the current litigation landscape and
are unrelated to arguments espoused by Texas. As I explained in an
earlier comment:
Long before the current litigation and unrelated to the
arguments espoused in Texas I have supported the
use of notice and comment rulemaking for the
longstanding deferred action program (pre-dating
DACA or DAPA) or, in the alternative, a program
assembled with more formality like the 2012 DACA
program. But my recommendation for codifying
deferred action reacts to a significant historical
absence of transparency and information about the
general deferred action program. No one could
suggest that the current DAPA program suffers from
a lack of transparency. Also important is the
difference between mandatory rulemaking required
by the APA and “voluntary” rulemaking that is
permissive—a distinction and discussion that has
had no real space in the current political landscape. 98
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Notably and unlike the secrecy that lines the traditional deferred
action program, DACA 2012 was announced by the President
himself in the White House Rose Garden with great fanfare. 99 Two
years later, the President made a national and televised
announcement about his plans to roll out executive actions on
immigration, including extended DACA and DAPA. 100 What
followed was a rigorous and controversial debate about the policy,
politics and legality of the President’s actions.
Beyond rulemaking, Beyond Deportation also calls on DHS
to create a form for deferred action requests, and to require a user
fee for processing the form. DHS should provide a written
notification of receipt and the outcome to each applicant or his or
her attorney. DHS should also make available to the public statistics
about all deferred action cases. Outside of the DACA program, DHS
continues to keep data about deferred action under wraps and only
partially obtainable through FOIA.
As to the broader prosecutorial discretion policy, Beyond
Deportation calls on DHS to look at the whole person when making
prosecutorial discretion decisions. Since the unleashing of the now
rescinded Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion on June 17,
2011, immigration advocates and attorneys have pointed to
instances where DHS failed to implement its own guidelines or,
alternatively, failed to create a policy that makes it possible for a
person with a specific indiscretion but strong humanitarian equities
to be protected from removal through a favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. 101 As an illustration, DACA, established in
2012, disqualifies individuals who have been convicted of a felony,
99
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“significant
misdemeanor”
or
three
“non-significant”
102
misdemeanors. Data obtained from ICE on individual deferred
action cases outside of the DACA program reveals that a significant
number of denials are driven by having a criminal history. 103
Likewise, immigration advocates and attorneys have featured the
stories of deported individuals like Pastor Max Friesen, a husband
and father to United States citizen children 104 and published related
reports about those “denied” prosecutorial discretion because of a
criminal history. 105 Together, these events have created a picture
where only people with compelling equities and no criminal record
will receive the temporary benefit of prosecutorial discretion. The
application of the more recent priorities memo only affirms this
sentiment.
Historically however, having a criminal record has not been
fatal to a prosecutorial discretion grant. As detailed in Beyond
Deportation and thanks to the groundbreaking research conducted
by Leon Wildes (who also authored the foreword for the book), the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) routinely processed
and granted deferred action cases for individuals with a wide range
of criminal activities—turpitudinous, drug-related, and fraudrelated. As described by Mr. Wildes: “In sum, [deferred action] has
been granted to those who have violated almost any provision of the
Act.” 106 Indeed, the agency had a history of protecting imperfect
people with strong humanitarian equities through prosecutorial
102
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discretion and deferred action in particular. Many of the elements
showcased by DHS in recent years as particularly positive qualities:
presence of family in the United States, residence in the United
States since childhood and role as a primary caregiver, among
others, resemble the equities long used by INS and DHS in
processing individual requests for prosecutorial discretion and
deferred action in particular. 107
Beyond Deportation also includes specific recommendations
for when prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. Discretion
should be exercised early in the process. As described earlier,
discretionary decisions can be made at many stages that include
prior to arrest, interrogation, detention, removal (deportation)
proceedings and even after a removal order has been entered. While
the various guidance documents suggest an early-stage enforcement,
there is good reason to believe that many people are placed into the
system or charged before prosecutorial discretion is considered. 108
Beyond Deportation also calls on DHS to adopt a national
policy that confirms through clear guidance how filing a Notice to
Appear can serve as a favorable act of prosecutorial discretion. To
summarize, the Notice to Appear or “NTA” is the charging
document utilized by DHS to trigger removal proceedings against a
noncitizen who is alleged to be in violation of the immigration law.
The idea of treating the filing of such documents as a “positive” act
of prosecutorial discretion may seem counterintuitive especially
when compared against how this kind of discretion works in the
criminal context but for some noncitizens this choice can be life
changing. For the undocumented individual who is potentially
eligible for relief like cancellation of removal, filing a Notice to
107
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Appear allows her to explain to an immigration judge how her
longtime residence, good standing, and compelling hardship to a
qualifying relative satisfy her burden for lasting relief. 109 For the
Central American mom who might otherwise be deported rapidly
through reinstatement, 110 a filed Notice to Appear enables her to see
an immigration judge and be afforded a fair hearing and the right to
apply for relief like adjustment of status (green card) or asylum. 111
Beyond Deportation recommends that individuals who
request prosecutorial discretion should be provided written notice
and should have a mechanism for review, particularly when the
denial is made without a rational explanation or departs from the
Department’s own policy. 112 Currently, there exists no formal
mechanism through which an individual or applicant can appeal a
prosecutorial discretion denial. 113
Prosecutorial discretion is an important tool in immigration
law that can preserve precious resources for the government while
protecting those with strong roots and equities inside the United
States. As Beyond Deportation shows, several changes to the
government’s current prosecutorial discretion policy can and should
be examined after the politics pervading any meaningful debate
subsides. Importantly however, prosecutorial discretion cannot
serve as a substitute for broader legislative reforms. Only Congress
can enact a comprehensive solution that enables millions of people
109
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without immigration status to come out of the shadows and be
placed on a path to security and eventual citizenship. 114
By the same token, prosecutorial discretion will continue to
be a powerful sword even after immigration reform becomes a
reality. Not every person with a compelling situation or deemed a
“low priority” for enforcement will meet the affirmative
requirements for a future legalization program. In this way, the
humanitarian and political reasons behind prosecutorial discretion
are in the same breath related and distinct. Each year Congress fails
to enact a holistic immigration system that channels people arriving
or residing in the United States from underground and into the rule
of law, humanitarian cases swell, requiring DHS to use prosecutorial
discretion as a temporary solution for those with compelling
equities. However, individuals and families with equities like U.S.
Citizen dependents, a medical condition or intellectual promise may
be ineligible for a legislative solution perhaps because of an
indiscretion that make him or her inadmissible or because the person
lacks the requisite number of years of presence to apply for a legal
status. Consequently, prosecutorial discretion and comprehensive
immigration reform cannot be viewed as “either or” options.
As lawyers, scholars and lawmakers grapple with the wave
of headlines or questions faced by the courts on the question of
prosecutorial discretion, I hope this article and my book provides a
deeper understanding for the historical role of ,and legal foundation
for, prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases and the extent to
which compassion has served as the foundation for how such
decisions are made.
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